The subject is fascinating and stimulates almost infinite reflections. Any approach will be necessarily limited and incomplete. My approach prefers to look on our common collective identity as human beings. It is divided into two parts. The first one could be called “what makes us be what we are?” and the second “what makes us be what we don’t want to be?”
In the first part I’m trying to make a brief summary of assumed or probable prehistories, first of humanity (our collective identity) and then the one of the human (our individual identity).
In the second part I’m trying to analyze the possible dangers on the balance between collective identities and individual identities in periods of destabilization from the Nazi Germany paradigm.
First part: What makes us be what we are?
I propose to start at the beginning, with our collective prehistory, that of our species, and I will follow the excellent book of Josef H. REICHHOLF, “The enigma of humanization. The creation of man through the interaction with nature”.
Why do I destabilize? Because I lifted one foot.
Why did I lift one foot? Because I want to take a step.
Why do I want to take a step? Because I want to walk and run.
Why should I run? Because I have to live.
It is me who walks and runs. But I’m not the only one who does it.
We are many. We walk and mostly we run.
Why do we run?
Because we have to arrive first at the big, dead animal that is going to be our food. We must have cut a few pieces of this big beast before the pack of jackals hunt us and before the vultures that lurk in the sky attack us.
We need to survive, like any other living being. And of course the more we are, the more meat we can offer to the others from our tribe who are waiting for us, taking care of our children and the fire.
Those are the conditions of life of our ancestor evolving in the savannah of East Africa, about four million years ago.
I started talking about our ancestors’ walking and running – on two feet –, but these would not be possible without standing, without the ability of an almost permanently sustainable standing stance.
It is this which has allowed us to stand higher than the grass around us, and it is the speed of our feet that allows us to recover the necessary amount before competition arrives.
Then, standing freed our hands and we were therefore able to run while carrying something.
According to some researchers, we were led to believe that this is originally a “mistake” of nature, or —to put it more scientifically— a genetic abnormality (“unfortunate”, perhaps), which raised our pelvis and then allowed our bipedalism.
After that, our whole architecture changed: the axis of our head was placed to right angle compared to that of our body, our pelvis got narrower and even more vertical. This shows our crucial problem: our foetal head became too large for our mother’s pelvis. Unlike other mammals, we cannot quietly finish our development in the safety of the womb; we must be expelled while still needing double the time to acquire the minimum motor autonomy that we begin to have at the age of one year.
One consequence of this early expulsion is that eighty percent of the construction and structuring of our brain, the basis of our individual identity, must be carried out among others in the group. And this group, the first group of people, is absolutely essential for our survival and that of our mother. With this “foetus” on the arms, still so incomplete, what could she do without her loved ones around?
Without the collective, there could be no individual life; and without individuals, able to “stand up” someday, there would be no society.
This vital need of the group for human survival could explain the power and the persistence of our herd instinct. We are already instinctively attracted to crowds; and once we have been received in a somewhat organized crowd, especially one led by a charismatic leader, our intellectual abilities diminish in favour of an increase in our emotional experiences, which communicates in crowds through a kind of “emotional contagion.” This psycho-physiological phenomenon can easily ensnare us, even today and despite the achievements of our civilization.
This will be further discussed in the second part, but it’s time to recognize how right Aristotle was when he described our species with his famous term, ζῷον πολιτικόν (social animal).
Individual prehistory, that of each one’s
In order to better understand what follows, we’ll stop a little at our own prehistory, our first experiences. Like the prehistory of our species, we can only “re-construct” those early experiences, for although they essentially determine the rest of our lives they elude our intellectual memory. However, they are “inscribed” in our body and our emotional heritage.
In a way it is curious that we count our age from birth! Of course, this is because the moment of birth is absolutely defined, yet it would not be meaningless to say that by the time of our birth we already have the experience of an eternity behind us. Our sense of temporality develops gradually after birth. As for our intrauterine life, the perceptions of “outside” and those of “inside” is absolutely different. Outwards, everything goes very fast: in three months our bodies are essentially built; after three more months our hearing is already so advanced that we are able to distinguish our mother’s voice from any other – without, of course, having any idea what “our mother” is. From inside “she” is probably our only universe. At this point I remember the phrase of a poet from Marseille: “Mother is the universe and man is the poet”.
Since then the idea of eternity remains inside us, as during these ” nine months of intrauterine life” we experience in some detail the entire phylogeny of living. I stress this sense of eternity to prepare our sensitivity for the first, perhaps the most “terrible” yet inevitable “destabilization” or crisis in life: birth.
So, we are swimming in eternity. We have lived in the shelter that everyone needs, in a watery world, warm and vibrant with the familiar sounds of the maternal body and all the other tones, more or less distant and pleasant. Although in this first ” two-member collective” we share the emotional state and the movements of the one who carries us, we are still spared the terrors of separation.
But there comes a day when we start to feel cramped. Perhaps we would then change the “environment”? Anyway, neither we nor our mother has a choice. ” Out!”, orders life; if you don’t come out, it will be your end.
What follows, what we call “birth”, is quite a crisis, since what was is no longer possible, and what will be is uncertain … But, “crisis” is just a word, what matters to us is always our first experience; and to our experience, the event is more like a terrible catastrophe.
After that everything is strange and difficult. Inside we didn’t have any need and we could move around quite easily. Now outside, unknown needs invade us suddenly without our having any means to satisfy them. We are reduced to launching distress signals, screams. But our screaming, intolerable even to us, in order to alert others by its powerful psychosomatic effect, can easily be “misunderstood” and misinterpreted. Thus, all that helplessness may tragically appear as an “all powerful” and provoke anger and hatred to the point of murder.
Among the legion of researchers who have been studying our individual prehistory in recent decades, I want to mention just one, Jean Marie DELASSUS, who emphasizes not only the violence of our infant experiences but also the infinite importance of mothering. It was he who founded the new medical-psychological discipline of “maternology”. I quote from his article, The First Violence:
“What causes this creature to be grounded, to be born and be unable to move? First of all he cannot meet his needs and get moving to meet them. This represents a major frustration because everything we experience – hunger, thirst, discomfort, fear, etc. -instead of turning into movement and action accumulates, reaching worrying proportions to make him scream, unable to do something else. It is then invaded by suffering, anguish and revolt; the absolute evil one comes. The motor incompetence is torture. […] This first violence is not limited to the first hours of life, it is repeated day after day, as motor skills and the capacity to act have yet to develop. Thus, the human baby is subjected for months to a regime of negation which will be his first real native experience and the most radical background of his existence. “
It should be added that during this period our senses and sensitivity are quite active and it is possible that we can already “unplug” when our suffering becomes intolerable, , perhaps not from all our sensitivity but at least from relational sensitivity (I am thinking of the syndrome of “institutionalisation” as described by René Spitz).
Later in life, depending on circumstances, this ability can save our lives but also destroy those of thousands – even millions – of others.
Even the best attention and care of the mother and other relatives cannot completely erase these terrible experiences, but can certainly diminish them.
I believe that we all have an almost automatic protective tendency that prevents us from realising the incredible scale of the torture experiences that we carry —albeit at vastly different degrees, of course.
How can one measure the tensions, especially during our first year outside the mother’s body-universe? We can only deduce them from the cruelties and atrocities, individual and collective, that our species is solely capable of. It seems to me that our “beastliness” comes not from the fact that we are “animals” or “barbarians”, but men; very “human” men…
I propose to illustrate a little this notion of intensity by reflecting on the subjective experience of time depending on the total duration of our experience:
If we are 2 months old and we have spent 15 days separated from our mother (e.g. due to hospitalization), this represents a quarter of our lives. At 40 years old it would represent 10 years of separation from a vitally important being.
Or, if at the age of two months our mother entrusted us to our grandmother and promised to take us back when we were 2 (something that does happen), it represents 12 times our life so far. It is as if, at the age of 40, a lover promised to return in 480 years!!
Let’s imagine that the terrifying events of our infant life remained dominant, or that we suffered some unusual and very dire experiences later in our lives. Then, we have only one desire: to return into this comforting prenatal universe where no such sufferings exist. This desire translates into a need, often impulsive, for regression and simplification. No matter what term we use, it comes to needs: the most human of needs, yet they can make us totally inhuman monsters.
These remarks lead us to the second part of my presentation, and the question of what makes us be what we (initially) don’t want to be?
The case of Nazi Germany.
We considered the anthropological foundation of our fragility and our individual vulnerability. They are probably also responsible for much of the imperfection of our societies, which are supposed to make up for our individual faults and shortcomings through solidarity, protection and justice.
Let us return to our subject: the interaction between collective identity and individual identity in times of destabilization.
I guess this theme was chosen because it is topical and we feel at risk, even in our relatively comfortable Europe. We wonder how we will fair, collectively and individually, if the current period of destabilization continues?
I’m no expert in sociology, economics or politics, but I can speak of such a “historical” example of a “fall” collective and individual, which occurred in a relatively recent unstable period (83 years after the coming to power of the Nazi party in late January 1933). This “fall”, we all remember, caused the most monstrous crimes of known human history.
As heir to the psychic and cultural constellation of the people who caused and/or failed to prevent this unique and unnamed tragedy, I always feel a deep uneasiness mixed with shame and guilt. It is not only my German heritage and the fact of having studied for some time the phenomenon of German Nazism that leads me to present this example, but also because we have a certain distance. In my presentation I will try to extract the universal aspects, so that our example can serve our current issues.
I’m trying to analyze one by one the three concepts stated above —collective identity, individual identity and period of destabilization— favouring a psychological perspective).
As in a “clinical case”, I shall start with the period before the onset of the disease, the period of destabilization.
In the case of Germany, from its birth as a unified nation in 1871, there have been two successive destabilizing periods: the participation in the First World War and its disastrous consequences, and then the provocation of the Second War World.
Without getting lost in historical considerations, it seems interesting to note that this destabilization was caused by a phenomenon of immoderation and excess – the Greek term hubris seems to correspond best.
The young Second Empire had found stability and the majority of people seemed to identify rather proudly with their new nation. But in the context of competition and rivalry among European empires of the time, the appetite for “more” won over the desire for stability.
The sanction of this excess was also exaggerated. The losers not only failed to achieve their goal —territorial growth, increased world power and glory— but lost much more than one could imagine in a worst-case scenario.
The other consequence of this overwhelming loss, was that the experienced humiliation could only provoke the desire for revenge and restoration. It is not surprising that a collective identity, which appeared so proud before that premature fall, avoids any self-criticism and looks for other culprits.
The failure of the first German Republic, the “Weimar Republic”, showed that the nation was not prepared to live in a democracy. They could not find satisfaction and stability unless there was a rebirth of an authoritarian system and a populist “revolution” which would build the Third Reich.
“The people” would become an absolute value beyond any social class differences. The slogan “one people, one empire, one leader” was omnipresent and the “atheist” policy was religiously charged.
A new stability was finally achieved, but at the cost of a cultural and civilizing regression, unlike any other excesses known in the history of mankind.
-This example makes us think: should we not be more afraid of “stability” than destabilization? In other words, how can we avoid stabilization becoming a cultural regression, i.e. a return to a prehistoric condition?
Speaking of stability, even if the Nazi Party did not have an absolute majority when its leader was appointed chancellor, thanks to his performance in internal policy and his success in foreign policy, by the end of 1938 more than 90% of the population were quite satisfied and believed in him. – With hindsight, this finding is even more scary and for many Germans still difficult to accept. But it illustrates that a merger of individual identities in a collective identity can well and truly occur.
The second period of destabilization was caused again by excess, even more staggering and monstrous this time, as it was based on an already established state excess. The almost total fusion between individual and collective and the totalitarian regime with its injustices and crimes were the symptoms of this arrogance. Enlarged hypertrophied power and physical strength stifled all criticism and creative spirit, which is reminiscent of a “bodybuilder” whose head shrinks and disappears before his muscles.
Having addressed destabilization and its consequences in the recent history of Germany, let’s take a (brief) look at what effect it can have on the individual and the collective, especially if it becomes entrenched for some time.
Without necessarily seeking to establish a hierarchy, we can observe above all how persistent anxiety can cause frustration and insecurity followed by psychic wear, fatigue, exhaustion, despair, idleness, depression and withdrawal. The more our condition becomes intolerable the more we feel the need for psychological relief and mental simplification. In this way we can at least relieve ourselves of the burden that our human condition imposes, i.e. to make choices, to deal with uncertainty, ambivalence etc. Being human is very tiring in itself. Nothing is more “natural” for us than the desire to settle, once and for all, the question of “what to do”. What a relief it is to rely on a leader who thinks and decides for us! What a relief to join in a mass where “everything is permitted” without feeling responsible! What an emotional comfort to share the same emotion with so many others!
The other huge weight imposed on us by the fact that we are human relates to the reality of our individual identity. In fact, we can never decide or determine once and for all exactly who we are. If an individual has a definite answer to this question, this may lead to a pathological perception of reality close to paranoia: “The paranoid […] is sure about what he is and at the same time what the others are.” In other words, he rejects all questioning and accuses others of any discomfort he experiences or any inconvenience he faces.
What a relief for the individual to shed “once for all” the burden of uncertainty about the ego – and the perpetual doubt, but what a terror for the others!
Another universal effect of any period of destabilization is the growth of political parties which offer not only quick and easy solutions but also causal theories about the present evil. As we have seen, these parties easily adopt a religious structure with the dominance of a “messianic” leader who promises deliverance. Collective movements that only target faith and the emotions benefit from man’s gregarious instincts and from the establishment of strong emotional ties between all members and the leader, as well as between the members themselves.
Now let us look more closely at the concept of individual identity.
We have seen that in order to better understand its interaction with collective identity, it may be useful to identify two parts in it. This is what George Herbert MEAD did when he distinguished the “I” , the more personal component, from “me” — the sociological component. The “I” as bearer of the most specific attributes of the individual must be constantly redefined (as we discussed above). The “me” is defined by our social roles, by the fact that we belong to collective groups and also by our material acquisitions (property). To determine the individual’s emotional investment in his social role we use the term “role identity”. Alfred KRAUS (a German psychiatrist and phenomenologist) created the term “hypernomie” to describe a type of social behaviour that predisposes one to melancholy. A hypernomique person “scrupulously respects the social norms and normative expectations corresponding to his role […] he accomplishes his tasks with zeal, in a spirit of excessive order and diligence,” but he lacks self-confidence and autonomy, he manifests conformist attitudes and shows an exaggerated willingness to adapt. To feel alive, he needs an over-identification with his role and the group he considers his.
Considering the features of a hypernomique’s social behaviour, it may help us to shed light on the question of how a very conscientious person may fall into the trap of nationalist propaganda.
Could such a mass movement like that of the German people under National Socialism ever exist without a significant number of people with a hypernomique type of behaviour?
This may help explain how well-educated, polite and honest people could not resist their existential need to stay within the Norm, even when the norm showed aspects that were unpleasant or went against their moral bearings. Faced with the impotence of their ego, their inability to “break ranks” and have “civil courage”, they followed. The only “freedom” they had left was to see the “good sides” like “the mobilization of the German people”  and the “restoration” of national pride in order to repress the evil aspect.
And, of course, it is evident that the famous German “administrative machine” was fully capable of seeing through the Nazi plans —the “final solution” included— since it consisted of personalities like these.
This type of behaviour fitted in, at least at the time, with the reference values in Germany. According to research by the French historian Philippe BURRIN, specialist in Nazism and the Holocaust, these values of the German collective identity are “obedience, discipline, submission to the orders of superiors, order, emotional control, precision, cleanliness and performance, especially in technical, military and sporting pursuits.”
Naturally, any collectivity will seek to promote the values with which it identifies. It does it through intra-family and institutional education. But an education inspired from the above principles doesn’t aim at creating free, autonomous individuals, sure of themselves. In fact, what happens is the opposite, and only essentially weak people can emerge.
An education so focused on obedience and submission can easily acquire a humiliating tone. A repeatedly humiliated individual, forbidden to express his emotions, will usually suppress his anger and accumulate an unsuspected amount of potential violence, usually hidden from both himself and the others. Here is a possible explanation for the cruel actions committed in a context where they were either ordered or tolerated.
Another inevitable consequence of a lack of personal identity is the desire to identify with the “lofty ideas” of the nation, especially those of the “Great”, the “Pure” and “Clean”.
A person lacking self-confidence and with a high need to be accepted will probably struggle to resist a collective “megalomania”. As for the idea of ”purity”, low personal identity can easily seek support in a collective ideology of a “pure race” and a “superior race.” Then the idea of ”Clean” can become an obsession for this person who, unable to have sufficient control of himself, may try to control (cleanse) his environment. On a collective level, this obsession may turn into compulsion that leads a nation to want to cleanse itself of impurities, i.e. the foreigners. And, by the standards of “cleanliness” on which the collective identity is defined, the country will get rid of the ‘unclean’, the gay, those of different religion, etc.
As we see, the concept of individual identity inevitably leads us to the concept of collective identity, especially when we are dealing with people of a weak personality.
Let us see this essential question again: how could a group commit and/or permit crimes of this size, particularly the Holocaust? Among the countless people who have worked towards an answer, Henri Tajfel stands out. Starting from the question of how such a large number of ‘ordinary Germans ‘ could back Nazism and particularly that irrational hostility against the Jews, he studied the phenomena of categorization and discrimination. So he opened a perspective of independent explanation of the concept of “premorbid” personality which we discussed earlier.
The essence of his experiments was to arbitrarily separate the participants into two groups. Although the subjects did not know one another before, and had no contact during the experiment, they nevertheless began to identify with their group and show a clear preference for members of their own group (the in-group). “Our people” were perceived as more likeable and scored higher (e.g. during competitions), while the “others” (the out-group) were treated with hostility and a rather ruthless manner.
TAJFEL and his colleagues found that this phenomenon of spontaneous identification with the in-group is independent of the particular characteristics of the subject such as age, sex, religion or nationality. Conclusion: as soon as we are part of a group that is defined in relation with another group, we automatically identify with our people and we are very easily trapped by the schema and the cognitive reflex of categorization, prejudice and discrimination. We can imagine how these “collective impulses” can be exploited and amplified by propaganda.
Although the phenomenon of identification with one’s own group is described as a cognitive automatism, It must be noted that it causes feelings of hostility and lack of compassion, which appear quite unfair from the outside. In the case of these experiments, as soon as they stop everything is reversible. Afterwards, the “guinea pigs” laugh and declare that “it was just a game.” But what happens if these phenomena occur in “real life”? When hostility becomes hatred and insensitivity turns into unscrupulousness? Nazism was surely a tragic demonstration of the “construction” of a hypertrophic and delirious collective identity which treated all Jews as hated enemies. How can a collective identity take such a pathological form and plunge the majority of its members into a frenzy of hatred?
The clarifications that I will present later are mainly inspired by Michael MULLER-CLAUDIUS. Born in 1888, this psychologist, educator and historian of German Protestant faith was a first-hand witness to the rise and fall of the Nazi monster. Recognizing anti-Semitism as the essential danger in Germany, he studied it in its psychological, historical and social aspects and led a decisive struggle against him.
To better understand the peculiarity of the “German character” compared to other west-European nations, here is a brief summary of the history of its social structure. The German collective identity, at least until 1945, was conditioned by autocracy. On the other hand, individual identities were marked by the voluntary renunciation of personal independence. The key for the individual was to be exemplary for his monarch. The pride of the individual was fed by the perfect fulfilment of his duties; and his sense of honour was his obedience, discipline and loyalty. It is mainly in the function of the soldier that the subject could prove these virtues; and the soldier could only find his self-fulfilment in war. The State of Prussia with its famous militarism is a perfect example of this form of collective identity. No doubt the majority of people must have felt reassured by this “paternalistic” society and probably found their “confidence” by “appropriating” the splendour and the achievements of their country. As for the rulers, they should govern in a manner worthy of their mission, so as not to give rise to seditious moves for democratic restructuring, especially among the middle class (who represented the state’s backbone).
To better analyze the subsequent development of the German collective identity and its fatal culmination, we must return to the period of destabilization after 1918.
According to MULLER-CLAUDIUS -the German soldier could be nothing but a victorious soldier losing the war was unthinkable. A culprit should be found. The culprit was soon found.
During 19th century the Jewish community was successfully integrated in the German nation and had a significant contribution to the growth, prosperity and reputation of the country. However, the old demons of mythicising the Jews as a symbol of evil had not disappeared from the unconscious. At the same time anti-Semitism was “modernized”, its Christian “legitimacy” giving way to arguments about “racial purity” and “national identity”. The defeat of 1918 and the general resentment had made the German collective identity lose its props. Individuals were left disoriented, scattered, full of anxiety and aggressiveness. One could even fear civil war. This destabilization went on for fifteen years and caused two reactions among a growing number of people: First, a desire for appeasement by establishing a strong state that could impose order and unite the people. Secondly, the awakening of national anti-Semitism and racism. What better way for a social group to unite than standing against another — especially when this other group can be blamed for the humiliating defeat of the country. Naturally the “culprit” evokes hatred for the terrible disaster he caused.
A growing mass movement was already emerging from 1918, and nine years later (in 1927) the great majority of the German population —80%, as noted by MULLER-CLAUDIUS— was “infected by anti-Semitism “. It was anti-Semitism, not the National Socialist party that had the task of unifying the German “mass soul” (Massenseele). But Hitler was able to use and appropriate it, proclaiming himself the “supreme master of anti-Semitism” and boosting the already existing hatred.
Let’s look more closely at how individual and collective identity is described in Hitler’s worldview. In simplistic terms, this world is like a herd. There is only one individual identity, that of the leader. Any other individual must surrender his personal conscience and individual moral responsibility to the “race consciousness” (Rassenbewusstsein).He should blend into what Hiller described as “the body of the people” (Volkskörper). This “new” community identity should be composed exclusively of Aryans. Its “mission” was to dominate over all humanity. In this it would be guided by the “race’s natural instinct.” Individual moral conscience, if it became obstructive, was not only undesirable but should be systematically crushed, especially within such elite groups as the “Hitler Youth” or the “quasi-religious” order of the SS.
To reach its goal and fulfil its mission, this “body” must first destroy the only rival in the quest for global power: Judaism.
Returning to psychological considerations, this position of the leader is quite clearly reminiscent of the instinctual desire to return to the first “collective” of the mother-child dyad, while destroying an imagined rival.
What about the “individual” psychology diluted in this “new collectivity”? No doubt the loss of personal liberty is compensated for by the experiences of superiority and power, and by exercising almost “free” violence and destruction that provides satisfaction and enjoyment.
What the Führer had not anticipated is that this exercise of violence and destruction, requiring insensitivity to victims, may remove all forms of sensitivity in the individual, even to the duties to his group and his superior. So in extreme cases we could watch the transformation of “total obedience” into total disobedience.
At this stage of regression of the human psyche —where the “other” is nothing but an object or a toy— torture and murder are sadistic pleasures in the intoxication of omnipotence. These behaviours, the scariest man can produce, cannot “fall from heaven”; nor can they be dismissed as ” awakened animal instincts.” They must necessarily come from us, from our history and our specific human conditions.
We spoke at the beginning of the extreme violence of our experience of powerlessness before making our first steps. – Instead of making us feel despair about ourselves for containing these painful somatic memories, it could give us a more complete understanding of this unexplored period of our lives that we idealize so willingly.
We know that through our psychic sufferings and excessive passions, experiences of our past may resurface, often in an unexpected and terrifying way. In the name of a therapeutic orientation, it seems essential to me to recognize these realities as ours and “reclaim” them as extreme possibilities. If we can accept these realities inside us, then we may resist better when we feel attracted to adverse traps.
In closingI should like to say something that may be obvious but represents a deep wish of mine: that the increasing consciousness about the importance of the premature phase of man’s development may help the children who come in the world to receive more and higher-quality care in order to be better equipped for coping with “infinity”, in other words with the incompleteness, vulnerability and instability of our human condition. Thus they will be more capable of maintaining a living dynamism if some destabilizing period threatens not only their individual but also their collective identity, because they are both of fundamental value for our existence and our civilization.
 EICHHOLF, Josef H., Das Rätsel der Menschwerdung. Die Entstehung des Menschen im Wechselspiel der Natur, DTV, München 1993. (5. Aufl. 2001)
 GRATALOUP, Christian, Faut-il penser autrement l’histoire du monde ? Armand Colin, 2011.
 FREUD, Siegmund, Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse, S. Fischer, Studienausgabe Band 9, 7. Auflage, 1989.
 MILECH, Titus, « L’en-nuit de Christian Gabrielle Guez Ricord », Sorgue, Poésie Art Littérature, n° 2, L’Isle-sur-la Sorgue, 2000. « Il n’y a de mère que l’univers. Et l’homme est son poète ».
 Concernant le drame du meurtre d’enfants par leur proches voir le livre, L’Allemagne maltraite ses enfants (non traduit en français) de Michael TSOKOS et Saskia GUDDAT, Deutschland misshandelt seine Kinder, Droemer Verlag, 2014.
 DELASSUS, Jean Marie, « Il faut bien que genèse se fasse », Revue Française de Psychiatrie et de Psychologie Médicale, N° 15, février 1998
 FRITZSCHE, Peter, Germans into Nazis. Harvard University Press, Cambridge/Mass. 1998
 VONDUNG, Klaus, Deutsche Wege zur Erlösung. Formen des Religiösen im Nationalsozialismus, Wilhelm Fink Verlag, München 2013.
 HAFFNER, Sebastian, Anmerkungen zu Hitler, Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 1978 (p. 42/43). Voir aussi : ROHKRÄMER, Thomas, Die fatale Attraktion des Nationalsozialismus. Über die Popularität eines Unrechts-regimes, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh GmbH, 2013 (p. 317).
 LAZAROU, Margarita et Titus MILECH, « La contradiction au cœur du peuple grec », Approches. Revue trimestrielle. Littérature et sciences humaines, N° 163, septembre 2015, Dacres éditions, 33, rue Galilée 75116 Paris.
 MELMAN, Charles, La psychanalyse explique-t-elle pourquoi le nazisme a été populaire ? Éditions de l’Association Lacanienne Internationale (ALI), 2012. http://www.freud-lacan.com/fr/dossier-lire-freud-lire-lacan/5348-la- psychanalyse-explique-t-elle-pourquoi-le-nazisme-a-ete-populaire
 FREUD, Sigmund, Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse, S. Fischer, Studienausgabe Bd. 9, 7.Auflage, 1989.
 MEAD, George Herbert, Mind, Self, and Society, ed. Charles W. Morris, University of Chicago Press, 1934
 KRAUS, Alfred, Identitätstherapie Melancholischer, in: Christoph MUNDT et al., Psychotherapie in der Psychiatrie, Springer Taschenbuch, 2013
 Die Bewegung“, la « mise en mouvement » du peuple allemand dans le sens de l’idéologie nazie.
 „Die Erhebung“, le « le réveil et soulèvement » de la nation afin de rétablir son honneur.
 BURRIN, Philippe, Ressentiment et apocalypse. Essai sur l’antisémitisme nazi, Seuil, 2005.
 Voir les excellentes études et analyses d’Alice MILLER, notamment : Am Anfang war Erziehung, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/Main, 1983.
 MÜLLER-CLAUDIUS, Michael, Der Antisemitismus und das deutsche Verhängnis, Haus Verlag, Frankfurt/Main 1948. (p. 48).
 Ibidem (p. 73).
 Ibidem (p. 108).
 MÜLLER-CLAUDIUS, Michael, Der Antisemitismus und das deutsche Verhängnis. (p. 108)
A comment in reference to Sophocles’ “Antigone”
By Katerina Theodoraki, Child Psychiatrist, Family Therapist
Sophocles in “Antigone”, deals with the issue of hypernomie, from the opposite perspective.